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Abstract—Truthful spectrum auction is believed to be an
effective method for spectrum redistribution. However, privacy
concerns have largely hampered the practical applications of
truthful spectrum auctions. In this paper, to make the applica-
tions of double spectrum auctions practical, we present a privacy-
preserving and socially efficient double spectrum auction design,
SDSA. Specifically, by combining three security techniques:
homomorphic encryption, secret sharing and garbled circuits,
we design a secure two-party protocol computing a socially
efficient double spectrum auction, TDSA, without leaking any
information about sellers’ requests or buyers’ bids beyond the
auction outcome. We give the formal security definition in our
context, and theoretically prove the security that our design
achieves. Experimental results show that our design is also
efficient in performance, even for large-scale double spectrum
auctions.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
The dilemma between the rapid growth of wireless technolo-
gies and the scarcity of radio spectrum has given rise to the
increasing demand for dynamic spectrum access. On the one
hand, the spectrum scarcity is rooted in the limited spectrum
resource, on the other hand it is aggravated by the traditional,
static and rigid spectrum allocation policies by governments
such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in
the United States. A survey [2] indicated that a significant
amount of licensed spectrum remains unused in many places
much of the time. Because of this, spectrum auctions allow
primary users lease their idle channels for profit to secondary
users who are starving for wireless spectrum, to improve the
spectrum utilization, and thus alleviate the spectrum scarcity
problem.
Recently, spectrum auctions have been studied extensively.
Most of the existing works have focused on the achievement
of truthfulness, stimulating each bidder to report its true
valuation, under the implicit assumption that the auctioneer
is trusted. However, if the auctioneer is actually dishonest,
some security attacks may be launched by the auctioneer (or
together with the corrupted bidders) to increase its profit while
damaging the interests of the honest bidders [3]. For example,
the auctioneer can directly change the pricing to improve its
revenue, or it can sell bidders’ bid data to get profit. If such
security issues are not appropriately addressed, the practical
applications of spectrum auctions may be greatly hampered.
The source of the above-mentioned security attacks is that
all bidders’ bids are completely disclosed to the auction-
eer in a spectrum auction without any security measure.
To prevent these attacks, privacy preservation is called for,
and in fact numerous works on privacy-preserving spec-
trum auctions have appeared. However, current works mainly
focus on privacy-preserving single-sided spectrum auctions
[3][4][5][6][7], while rarely address privacy-preserving double
spectrum auctions [8]. The reason may be that privacy preser-
vation in double spectrum auctions requires more complicated
secure operations, and is more challenging than that in single-
sided ones. Furthermore, though paper [8] indeed provided a
secure double spectrum auction design PS-TRUST based on
TRUST, from the view of practical applications, it still suf-
fers the following two drawbacks. First, PS-TRUST incurred
heavy overhead in term of computation and communication
performance in large-scale auction scenarios. Second, PS-
TRUST is based on TRUST, an early truthful double spectrum
auction mechanism enabling spectrum reuse, but in practical
applications, we may want to base on the improved version of
TRUST, such as TDSA [9], while the direct transplant of PS-
TRUST to TDSA is found to be insecure as later we will see.
Therefore, a secure and efficient design for double spectrum
auctions is still lacked.
B. Contributions and Results
In this paper, we propose SDSA, Secure design for Double
Spectrum Auctions based on TDSA, a more socially efficient
double spectrum auction mechanism compared to TRUST.
Our main idea is to introduce an agent who cooperates with
the auctioneer to perform the secure auction computation,
using the technology of secure two-party computation. In
the auction framework as illustrated in Fig. 1, each seller
submits its request and each buyer submits its bid, encrypted
by the agent’s public key, to the auctioneer, who thus cannot
decrypt the encrypted bids directly; then, with these encrypted
requests and bids, the auctioneer and the agent perform the
double spectrum auction cooperatively and securely, without
any information about the requests or bids beyond the auction
outcome leaked to anyone of them; finally, the auction out-
come is released to the sellers and buyers by the auctioneer
and the agent cooperatively. As long as the auctioneer and the
agent do not collude, SDSA is proved to be secure.
Our main contributions can be described as follows.
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Fig. 1. Auction Framework for SDSA
• We design a privacy-preserving yet practical double spec-
trum auction mechanism based on TDSA, combining
the three security techniques, homomorphic encryption,
secret sharing and garbled circuits, and formally prove
that it is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
• To address the secure buyer group problem, we propose a
novel technique, joint encryption, which encrypts a mes-
sage between two parties, and discuss its nice properties
for privacy preservation.
• To apply garbled circuits to the auction process so that
both sellers’ and buyers’ privacies are well preserved, we
design an elaborate and efficient data-oblivious algorithm
of the underlying spectrum auction mechanism.
• We implement SDSA, and do extensive experiments to
evaluate the performance in term of both computation
and communication overheads.
C. Related Work
Truthful double spectrum auctions. Truthfulness attribute
is usually emphasized in the design of double spectrum
auctions. In the past few years, many mechanisms for truthful
double spectrum auctions have been proposed. For example,
Zhou et al. put forward TRUST [10], the first truthful double
spectrum auction framework enabling spectrum reuse. Later,
Yao et al. improved TRUST with an elaborated pricing mech-
anism, getting a more socially-efficient auction mechanism
TDSA [9]. Next, Chen et al. extended TRUST to enable multi-
channel trades between sellers and buyers [11]. More recently,
Chen et al. presented the first double auction design, TAMES
[12], for heterogeneous spectrum. Dong et al. proposed the
first double spectrum auction design that explicitly decoupled
the buyer-side and seller-side auction design while achieving
economic-robustness [13]. However, all the studies mentioned
above fail to consider the protection of bid privacy in the
process of the auction.
Secure traditional auctions. In the past decade, a line
of research has been devoted to secure or privacy-preserving
auctions for traditional goods (e.g., stamps, antiques). The
authors of [14] [15] [16] [17] employed various cryptographic
techniques to design different secure auction mechanisms.
Unfortunately, these secure traditional auction mechanisms
failed to consider spectrum reuse, and thus they would lead to
spectrum under-utilization when directly applied to spectrum
allocation.
Secure spectrum auctions. Recently, more and more stud-
ies are devoted to secure spectrum auctions. Pan et al. [3]
provided the earliest spectrum auction design, starting this
line of research. Later, the authors of [4] [8] [18] [19] [6]
[20] proposed various secure spectrum auction designs, with
different emphasis. However, most of the existing studies
focused on secure single-sided spectrum auctions, while secure
double spectrum auctions were rarely addressed. Although
both papers [8] and [19] indeed addressed secure double
spectrum auction problems, paper [8] was distinguished from
our work as pointed out in Section I-A, while paper [19]
employed three-party computation, which requires a strong
security assumption. In this paper, we will focus on the design
of a secure, efficient and practical double spectrum auction
mechanism, by leveraging on techniques of secure two-party
computation.
Our preliminary version. A preliminary version [1] con-
taining a subset of results of this paper has been presented in
IEEE/ACM IWQoS 2017 held in Barcelona, Spain. Compared
to the conference paper, this paper makes the following novel
technical contributions:
1) Improved definition of joint encryption with randomiza-
tion fields: We improve the proposed technique, joint
encryption, with randomization fields, describe its tech-
nical content in detail, and discuss its good properties for
privacy preservation.
2) Detailed security proof of our design: We prove the
security of our design formally using the simulation based
approach.
3) A brief review of related work: We add a brief review of
the related work, and point out the necessity of our work.
4) Design challenges and design rationale: We add an
illustration of design challenges(with an example), and
a description of the design rationale to address these
challenges.
5) Experimentation: We have redone the experiments with
our improved joint encryptions to evaluate its perfor-
mance and demonstrate its practicality.
Additionally, we have incorporated valuable feedback from
the conference on our work, which results in significant
improvement on both technical and editorial presentation.
D. Paper Orgnization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the problem is formulated. Section III provides
technical preliminaries. We describe the design challenges and
rationale in Section IV, and present the detailed design of
SDSA and prove its security in Section V. In Section VI, we
implement SDSA, and evaluate the performance in terms of
computation and communication overhead. Finally, the paper
is concluded in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM AND CHALLENGES
A. Double Spectrum Auction Problem
Double spectrum auction deals with the problem of how to
organize trade between a set of secondary spectrum users (buy-
ers) and a set of primary spectrum users (sellers). For example,
3double spectrum auction may be used as an effective approach
by the FCC, which aims at reallocating spectrum licenses from
TV broadcasters to mobile communication providers.
In our context, double spectrum auction is modeled as a
sealed bid auction, where M sellers want to sell their idle
spectrum channels to N buyers that need more spectrum.
Notice that a spectrum auction is essentially different from
a conventional auction in that spectrum can be reused by
multiple buyers on the condition that they do not interfere
with each other, and there are always far more buyers than
sellers. In our double spectrum auction, each seller m submits
its request Qm, while each buyer n submits its geographic
location (xn, yn) and bid Bn to the auctioneer, who evaluates
the requests and bids, and determines the winning sellers
and buyers and their respective clearing prices. For clarity,
we assume that a seller provides one channel for sale and a
buyer purchases one channel. All channels sold by sellers are
homogeneous.
B. TDSA Auction Mechanism
To address the above-mentioned double spectrum auction
problem, TRUST [10] provided a representative truthful
auction mechanism enabling spectrum reuse. Later, TDSA [9]
improved TRUST to exploit better spectrum reusability, with
all economic robustness well preserved. Specifically, TDSA
consists of the following five steps.
(1) Buyer group formation: The auctioneer privately con-
structs a conflict graph of buyers according to their geographic
locations, and forms non-conflict and bid-independent buyer
groups subject to the conflict graph. The buyer groups are
denoted as Gt, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}.
(2) Virtual group bidding: Assume there are Rt members
in group Gt. For each group Gt, TDSA first sorts bids of
buyers in non-increasing order: Bt,1 ≥ Bt,2 ≥ · · · ≥ Bt,Rt .
Let the set VGj = {Bt,1, Bt,2, . . . , Bt,j} be a virtual group
whose virtual group bid is Bvt,j = Bt,j × j. Then, group Gt
has Rt virtual groups denoted as VGj , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Rt}. The
bid of group Gt could be described as B
g
t = maxj(B
v
t,j). In
the next step, each buyer group Gt will act as a single “buyer”
bidding its group bid Bgt .
(3) Preliminary winner determination: McAfee’s design
is applied in this step. First, sort the requests of sellers in non-
decreasing order, and sort the group bids of buyer groups in
non-increasing order.
O′ : Q1 ≤ Q2 ≤ . . . ≤ QM
O′′ : Bg1 ≥ Bg2 ≥ . . . ≥ BgT
Then, find the last profitable index as follows:
Φ = arg maxφ≤min{T,M}{Bgφ ≥ Qφ andBgφ 6= Bgφ−1}
The winning sellers are the top Φ − 1 sellers in O′, and
the clearing price for them is the Φth ranked seller’s request
(P s = QΦ). Similarly, the preliminary winning buyer groups
are the top Φ− 1 buyer groups in O′′, and the corresponding
clearing price is the Φth ranked buyer group’s bid (P g = B
g
Φ).
(4) Washing out: This step is carried out in each win-
ning buyer group to remove buyers whose bids are too
low to afford the clearing price. For each winning group
Gt, TDSA first sorts buyers’ bids in non-increasing order,
Bt,1 ≥ Bt,2 ≥ · · · ≥ Bt,Rt , and then washes out buyers
in Gt one by one from Rt to 1, until it finds a virtual
group VGCt = {Bt,1, Bt,2, . . . , Bt,Ct} whose virtual bid is
higher than the clearing price for winning buyer groups (i.e.,
Bvt,Ct = Bt,Ct × Ct > P g).
(5) Final pricing: The auctioneer buys a channel from each
winning seller at the price of P s, and sells a distinct channel
to each winning group at the price of P g . Furthermore, in a
winning group Gt, each winning buyer equally pays P
g
Ct
.
In the auction, the symbols used are summarized in Tab. I.
TABLE I
KEY SYMBOLS FOR SDSA
M , N numbers of sellers and buyers
T numbers of buyer groups
Qm, Bn request of seller m, and bid of buyer n
(xn, yn) location of buyer n
Bgt group bid of group t
Rt numbers of buyers within group t
Ct numbers of winning buyers within group t
S S = {Qi}Mi=1, global bid set of sellers
Gt Gt = {Bgt , {Bt,j}Rtj=1}, per-group bid set
G G = {Gt}Tt=1, global bid set of groups
P s clearing price for winning sellers
P g clearing price for winning buyer groups
P bn clearing price for winning buyer n
C. Security Requirements
Our aim is to design a privacy-preserving double spectrum
auction mechanism (SDSA) based on TDSA in the semi-
honest adversary model, such that this mechanism reveals to
any party nothing about the sensitive inputs (e.g., all sellers’
requests, and all buyers’ bids) except the auction outcome.
Here, by any party, we mean:
• The auctioneer;
• The agent, who is introduced for secure computations;
• The sellers and buyers;
• And anyone not participating in the auction.
By the auction outcome, we mean:
• All winning sellers and their clearing prices;
• All winning buyer groups and their clearing prices.
Ideally, our secure mechanism requires that, through the
auction, any party can only learn the auction outcome, but
nothing else about the sensitive inputs. This can be simply
verified for the sellers and buyers, and anyone not participating
in the auction, since they do not take part in the auction com-
putations, and what they get from the auction is the published
auction outcome. However, it is much more complicated to
prove this for the auctioneer or the agent, because all secure
computations are performed between them. We define formally
the computation security in our context, in term of two-party
computation security definition [21], as follows.
Definition 1 (Security against semi-honest adversaries).
Let f(x, y) be a two-party auction functionality with the
inputs x and y from the two parties, respectively, and an
4auction outcome f(x, y). Suppose that protocol Π computes
functionality f(x, y) between the auctioneer and the agent. Let
V ΠA (x, y) (resp. V
Π
B (x, y)) represent the auctioneer’s (resp.
the agent’s) view during an execution of Π on (x, y). In other
words, if (x, rΠA) (resp. (y, rΠB)) denotes the auctioneer’s (resp.
the agent’s) input and randomness, then
V ΠA (x, y) = (x, rΠA,m1,m2, ...,mt), and
V ΠB (x, y) = (y, rΠB ,m1,m2, ...,mt)
where {mi}ti=1 denote the messages passed between the two
parties. Let OΠ(x, y) denote the auction outcome after an
execution of Π on (x, y). Then we say that protocol Π is secure
(or preserves privacy) against semi-honest adversaries if there
exist probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) simulators S1 and
S2 such that
{(S1(x, f(x, y)), f(x, y))} c≡ {(V ΠA (x, y), OΠ(x, y))} (1)
{(S2(y, f(x, y)), f(x, y))} c≡ {(V ΠB (x, y), OΠ(x, y))} (2)
where
c≡ denotes computational indistinguishability.
Thus, the security requirements are essentially that the
auction computation between the auctioneer and the agent
should satisfy the above security definition.
III. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce technical preliminaries, i.e.,
garbled circuits, Pallier cryptosystem and joint encryption, for
our design.
A. Garbled Circuit
Garbled circuits [22] [23] (a.k.a. Yao’s protocol) is an
efficient method for general secure two-party computation.
Suppose that two parties A and B want to compute a joint
functionality f(x, y) (represented by a Boolean circuit) with
A’s input x and B’s input y. The basic idea of garbled circuits
is that one party, say A, constructs a garbled circuit from
f(x, y), and the other party, say B, computes the garbled
circuit without learning any input and intermediate values.
Garbled circuits protect privacy so long as the two parties do
not collude with each other. The protocol proceeds as follows.
Garbled circuit construction. Party A constructs a garbled
circuit consisting of multiple binary gates, each of which
has two input wires and one output wire, as below. First, A
chooses two random cryptographic keys, K0wi and K
1
wi , for
each wire wi of the circuit (K0wi encodes a 0-bit, and K
1
wi
encodes a 1-bit, but Kσwi does not reveal σ). Thus, for each
gate g (e.g., an AND gate as illustrated in Tab. II), six keys
K0wi ,K
1
wi ,K
0
wj ,K
1
wj ,K
0
wk
,K1wk will be obtained corresponding
to the two input wires wi, wj and the output wire wk. Next,
A computes the four ciphertexts
Enc
K
bi
wi
,K
bj
wj
(K
g(bi,bj)
wk ) for bi, bj ∈ {0, 1}
These four ciphertexts are then randomly ordered, and con-
stitute a garbled gate g. The collection of all garbled gates
forms the garbled circuit, and a corresponding decoding table,
which converts the output keys of the garbled circuit to real
TABLE II
A GARBLED AND GATE: g(bi, bj) = bi ∧ bj
bi ↔ wi bj ↔ wj g(bi, bj)↔ wk Garbled value
0↔ K0wi 0↔ K0wj 0↔ K0wk Enc(K0wi ,K0wj )(K
0
wk )
0↔ K0wi 1↔ K1wj 0↔ K0wk Enc(K0wi ,K1wj )(K
0
wk )
1↔ K1wi 0↔ K0wj 0↔ K0wk Enc(K1wi ,K0wj )(K
0
wk )
1↔ K1wi 1↔ K1wj 1↔ K1wk Enc(K1wi ,K1wj )(K
1
wk )
bits, is created. Finally, A sends both the garbled circuit and
the decoding table to B.
Input garbling. Having constructed the garbled circuit and
the decoding table, A also has to garble both inputs x and
y. For input x, i.e., A’s input, A can simply encode it into
random keys G(x), and send G(x) to B. For input y, i.e.,
B’s input, B cannot directly send y to A for garbling due to
the privacy of y, but both A and B engage in a 1-out-of-2
oblivious transfer protocol, and thus B also gets random keys
G(y) corresponding to y.
Garbled circuit computation. Upon receiving the garbled
circuit, the decoding table, and the garbled inputs G(x)
and G(y), B computes the garbled circuit with G(x) and
G(y), obtains the garbled result G(f(x, y)), and subsequently
decodes it with the decoding table to get the output f(x, y) in
the clear. Finally, if necessary, B will send the common result
f(x, y) to A.
B. Paillier Cryptosystem
Paillier cryptosystem (G, E, D) [24] is a widely-used
homomorphic encryption, where G, E and D denote the key
generation, encryption and decryption algorithms, respectively.
Key generation: (pk, sk) = G(1γ).
1) Choose two large random prime numbers p and q and
independently of each other such that gcd(pq, (p− 1)(q −
1)) = 1.
2) Compute n = pq, λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1).
3) Select random integer g where g ∈R Z∗n2 .
4) Compute µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1 mod n if exist, where
L(x) = (x− 1)/n.
5) The public key pk is (n, g) and the private key is (λ, µ).
Encryption: c = Epk(m, r).
1) Let m be a message to be encrypted where m ∈ Zn.
2) Select random r where r ∈ Zn.
3) Compute ciphertext as c = gm · rn mod n2.
Decryption: m = Dsk(c).
1) Let c be the ciphertext to decrypt where c ∈ Z∗n2 .
2) Compute ciphertext as m = L(cλ mod n2) · µ mod n.
Given messages m1, m2, m, random numbers r0, r1, r2
and r, and the integer n, which is the product of two large
primes, i.e., n = p × q, we can conclude the three technical
properties of Paillier cryptosystem as follows.
(1) Indistinguishability. Considering a message m is en-
crypted twice, these two ciphertexts E(m, r1) and E(m, r2)
are thoroughly independent, and no one can determine whether
they correspond to the same message with a probability
significantly higher than random guess without decrypting
them.
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(2) Homomorphic addition. The product of two ciphertexts
will decrypt to the sum of their corresponding messages, and
the kth power of a ciphertext will decrypt to the product of
the message and k, where k is a constant.
D(E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) mod n2) = m1 +m2 mod n
D(E(m, r)k mod n2) = k ·m mod n
(3) Self-blinding. Any ciphertext can be publicly changed
into another one without affecting the message. Specifically,
a different randomized ciphertext E(m, r′) can be computed
from the ciphertext E(m, r) by multiplying a ciphertext of
zero, but without decryption and re-encryption.
D(E(m, r) · E(0, r0) mod n2) = D(E(m+ 0, r′))
= D(E(m, r′))
= m mod n,
where E(m, r′) 6= E(m, r).
Notice that every encryption E(m, r) of Paillier cryptosys-
tem requires a random number r, which allows the randomized
encryption. For simplicity, we will omit r in the paper that
follows, and denote E(m, r) with public key pk as [m]pk,
while bear in mind the randomness.
C. Joint Encryption
On the basis of the Paillier cryptosystem, we design the
joint encryption, which allows two parties to jointly encrypt
a message without learning the message. Furthermore, joint
encryption allows any party to randomize a joint ciphertext,
such that any other parity (including the two encrypting
parties) cannot link the randomized form to its original form.
Let (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2) denote the public/private key
pairs of party 1 and party 2, respectively. n1 and n2 represent
the corresponding products of two large primes. The joint
encryption of a message m is defined as (see Fig. 2):
〈([m1])pk1 , ([m2])pk2〉 = 〈[m′1]pk1 , [m′2]pk2〉
= 〈[m1 + τ1]pk1 , [m2 + τ2]pk2〉
(3)
where m1 + m2 = m (mod 2K) with m, m1, m2 ∈ Z2K ,
and K is the bit number used to represent the plaintext fields;
τ1, τ2 ∈ [2K , 2K+K′), and K ′ is the bit number for the
randomization fields; obviously, 0 < 2K+K
′
< min(n1, n2).
Particularly, a secret value x ∈ Z2K held by an external
user can be jointly encrypted by the two parties as follows.
1) The external user encrypts x with the public key of a
party, say party 2, and sends the resulted ciphertext [x]pk2
to another party, party 1.
2) Party 1 selects random number s ∈ Z2K uniformly, then
divides x into two shares by computing
[x1]pk1 ← [s]pk1 mod n21 and (4)
[x2]pk2 ← [x]pk2 · [2K − s]pk2 mod n22. (5)
3) Party 1 modifies x1 and x2 with randomization fields
τ1 ∈R [2K , 2K+K′) and τ2 ∈R [2K , 2K+K′), respec-
tively, where K1 and K2 represent the bit numbers of n1
and n2, respectively, and K ′ represents the bit number
for randomization fields.
([x1])pk1 ← [x1]pk1 · [τ1]pk1 mod n21 (6)
([x2])pk2 ← [x2]pk2 · [τ2]pk2 mod n22 (7)
Finally, it gets the joint encryption 〈([x1])pk1 , ([x2])pk2〉.
The randomization fields τ1 and τ2 above are indispensable.
To understand the purpose of them, consider the case when
the secret shares x1 and x2 in plaintext fields are reallocated,
e.g., Eq. (4) and (5) (Note that the shares are reallocated from
〈0, x〉 to 〈x1, x2〉). Specifically, in Eq. (5), when the two K-bit
numbers x and (2K − s) are added together in the plaintext
space, there may be a carry bit 1 to the (K + 1)th bit. If
nothing is done with this carry bit, then it can be used to link
the resulted form of x to its original form. For example, if
there is a carry bit 1 in Eq. (5), then we can link the resulted
joint ciphertext to a larger x with more probability. To hide this
carry bit, we add random numbers τ1, τ2 ∈R [2K , 2K+K′) to
the randomization fields. Since the carry bit is 0 or 1, then the
resulted distributions of randomization fields are [2K , 2K+K
′
)
and [2K + 1, 2K+K
′
+ 1), which are indistinguishable from
each other only with negligible exception (i.e., 21−K
′
) if K ′
is of the order of the security parameter.
If the two parties are clear in the context, we denote [[x]] =
〈([x1])pk1 , ([x2])pk2〉 for short, and call [[x]] a joint ciphertext
of x. Note that [[x]] can be held by both party 1 and party 2,
but none of them can learn any information about x as long
as they do not collude with each other. Furthermore, if each
party i decrypts its corresponding part [[x]]i = ([xi])pki , they
get their respective additive shares xi of x.
The joint encryption based on Paillier cryptosystem satisfies
the same properties (i.e., indistinguishability, homomorphic
addition, and self-blinding) as Paillier cryptosystem for parties
other than the encrypting parties, as well as an additional
property (i.e., strong self-blinding) even for the encrypting
parties. We describe the properties as follows.
(1) Indistinguishability. This property holds straightforward
due to the fact that a joint encryption is composed of two
Paillier encryptions.
(2) Homomorphic addition. Let [[x]] and [[y]] be the joint
encryptions of messages x, y ∈ Z2K and let k ∈ N be a public
constant. Joint ciphertext [[x + y]] and [[kx]] can be computed
as follows.
D(pk1,pk2)([[x]] · [[y]])
= 〈Dpk1(([x1 + y1])pk1), Dpk2(([x2 + y2])pk2)〉
= (x+ y) (mod 2K)
D(pk1,pk2)([[x]]
k)
= 〈Dpk1(([k · x1])pk1), Dpk2(([k · x2])pk2)〉
= k · x (mod 2K)
(3) Self-blinding. This property can be easily derived from
the homomorphic addition property of Pallier cryptosystem.
(4) Strong self-blinding. Last but not least, we denote the
important additional property of our joint encryption as strong
6self-blinding, which allows any party 1 or 2 to change a
joint ciphertext into another form. Different from self-blinding,
strong self-blinding, SS-blinding for short, changes not only
the random parameters in two Paillier ciphertexts but also
the secret shares with respect to each party. Specifically, SS-
blinding can be carried out by party i(i = 1, 2) as below.
For a joint ciphertext [[x]], party i first computes [[0]] =
〈([ν])pk1 , ([2K − ν])pk2〉, where ν ∈R Z2K . Then, party i
changes the form of [[x]] by adding 0 to the plaintext using
homomorphic addition as follows.
[[x]] · [[0]] = 〈([x1])pk1 , ([x2])pk2〉 · 〈([ν])pk1 , ([2K − ν])pk2〉
= 〈([x1 + ν])pk1 , ([x2 + 2K − ν])pk2〉
= 〈([x(1)1 ])pk1 , ([x(1)2 ])pk2〉
= [[x]](1)
where x(1)1 + x
(1)
2 = x (mod 2
K) still holds. We denote the
resulted form by [[x]](1) = 〈([x(1)1 ])pk1 , ([x(1)2 ])pk2〉, which is
another joint encryption form of the original message x. It is
obvious that a joint ciphertext [[x]] can be SS-blinded many
times if necessary, and we denote the ϕth SS-blinding of [[x]]
as [[x]](ϕ). Intuitively, when it comes to a specific protocol
containing many joint ciphertexts, SS-blinding from party i
prevents the other party from linking a joint ciphertext with
its SS-blinded forms.
Although we only focus on two parties, our joint encryption
can be easily extended to multiple parties.
IV. SDSA: DESIGN CHALLENGES AND RATIONALE
In this section, we describe the design challenges and
rationale of SDSA.
A. Design Challenges
Recently, a secure mechanism for double spectrum auctions
based on TRUST, called PS-TRUST, has been proposed [8].
However, to achieve a better auction performance, a secure
version of TDSA mechanism is demanded. We argue that
secure spectrum auction design based on TDSA is challenging.
With the example of TDSA auctions as depicted in Fig. 3, we
show the design challenges as follows.
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Fig. 3. An example of TDSA auctions. There are 3 sellers and 10 buyers in
a double spectrum auction. The requests of the three sellers are Q1 = 20,
Q2 = 25, and Q3 = 28, respectively. The conflict graph of buyers and the
bids of the buyers are shown. Applying TDSA procedure, the auction outcome
can be finally obtained.
First, the direct application of the design rationale of PS-
TRUST to TDSA makes the resulted mechanism insecure.
Following the design of PS-TRUST, the step of buyer group
formation is performed without any security guarantee by the
auctioneer, who thus obtains all buyer groups G1, G2 and
G3. Additionally, the auctioneer certainly knows the auction
outcome including winners (sellers 1 and 2, and buyer groups
G∗1 and G
∗
2) and prices (selling price 28 and buying price 30)
at the end of the auction. Therefore, the auctioneer can easily
know which buyers in G1 and G2 are washed out, and their bid
ranges, e.g., buyer C is washed out from G1 and its bid value
is no more than 10 (= 303 ). However, these information goes
beyond the auction outcome, and the security requirements are
not satisfied. The security of this auction design fails.
Second, securing the step of buyer group formation com-
pletely will lead to a heavy performance overhead. One way
to address the first challenge is to form buyer groups securely.
However, a completely secure buyer group formation protocol
will incur a very high computational complexity, e.g., the
direct conversion from a buyer group formation algorithm to a
garbled circuit requires a computational complexity of O(N3),
where N is the number of buyers, and the performance
overhead will be unbearable for practical applications.
Finally, TDSA has a more complicated auction procedure
than TRUST. For example, TDSA needs steps of virtual group
bidding and washing out, respectively, before and after the
step of preliminary winner determination. How to perform the
auction computation securely requires careful design.
B. Design Rationale
Our main idea is to securely perform double spectrum
auction of TDSA between the auctioneer and the agent, by
leveraging the techniques of secure two-party computation.
Secure two-party computation aims at jointly computing a
function f between two parties over their inputs while keep
those inputs private. All that parties can learn is what they
can learn from the output and their own respective inputs. In
this work, we consider the auction computation as a function
f whose inputs are the requests of M sellers and the bids
of N buyers. Although it is possible for the auctioneer, the
sellers and the buyers to jointly and securely compute the
auction without introducing the agent, it would lead to a heavy
communication overhead among the participants, making the
secure auction less practical.
Particularly, we address the first two challenges by provid-
ing a secure buyer grouping protocol with a tradeoff between
security and efficiency, and address the third challenge using
the technique of garbled circuits. More specifically, to design
such a secure grouping protocol, we let the auctioneer encrypt
all node information (i.e., buyer IDs and bids) of the conflict
graph using our joint encryption based on Paillier cryptosys-
tem, and outsource the grouping procedure to the agent, who
obtains and randomizes all the groups and returns them to the
auctioneer. This grouping protocol makes the auctioneer learn
nothing about the grouping information (e.g., which buyers in
which group), preventing it from learning which buyers are
washed out and what their bid ranges are, and thus achieves
7higher security. To make use of garbled circuits, we design
an efficient data-oblivious auction algorithm, whose execution
path does not depend on its input, and then turn it into the
boolean circuit that the garbled circuit is based on.
V. SDSA: DESIGN DETAILS AND PROOFS
In this section, we elaborate on the design of SDSA, and
prove that it is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
A. Overall Protocol
Overall, SDSA is a secure protocol for double spectrum
auctions executed mainly by the auctioneer and the agent. To
achieve security and efficiency, this protocol combines three
security techniques, homomorphic encryption (i.e., Paillier
cryptosystem), garbled circuits (a.k.a. Yao’s protocol), and
secret sharing. Specifically, homomorphic encryption is used
for secure buyer grouping, garbled circuits are used for secure
auction processing, while secret sharing is used for the switch
between the former two techniques.
Assume that the auctioneer (A) and the agent (B) have pub-
lic/private key pairs of Paillier cryptosystem, (pkA, skA) and
(pkB , skB), respectively, and there are authenticated secure
channels between the auctioneer and the agent, as well as
between the auctioneer and each seller or each buyer. SDSA
comprises three phases as follows. In Phase I, all sensitive
inputs (i.e., all sellers’ IDs and requests, and all buyers’ IDs
and bids) are encrypted with the agent’s public key pkB , and
submitted to the auctioneer, while the insensitive inputs (all
buyers’ geographic locations) are submitted to the auctioneer
in the clear. Note that in this phase the auctioneer can only
know the insensitive inputs, but not the sensitive inputs. In
Phase II, both the auctioneer and the agent cooperatively
perform the secure group formation, such that anyone of
them knows little about the group information. In Phase III,
both the auctioneer and the agent cooperatively perform the
secure auction and obtain the auction outcome, without leaking
any information about the sensitive inputs beyond the auction
outcome. The overall protocol is shown in Protocol 1.
B. Detailed Design
Now we present the detailed design of each phase as
follows.
Phase I: Submission
In this phase, sellers and buyers provide the auctioneer with
inputs of the auction. There are two types of inputs, sensitive
and insensitive, according to the relevance to requests or bids
(sellers’ or buyers’ privacy). In light of this, sensitive inputs
include all sellers’ IDs and requests, and all buyers’ IDs and
bids, while insensitive inputs include all buyers’ locations. All
sensitive inputs are encrypted with the agent’s public key pkB
and submitted to the auctioneer, preventing the auctioneer from
learning them, while insensitive inputs are submitted in the
clear also to the auctioneer. A seller or a buyer can go off-
line after submission. The tuples submitted by the sellers and
buyers are described as follows.
Seller m: ([IDsm]pkB , [Qm]pkB ), for m = 1, 2, ...,M
Protocol 1 SDSA: Secure Double Spectrum Auction
Input: The boolean auction circuit publicly known.
Output: Auction outcome in the clear.
Phase I: Submission
1: Sellers: Each seller m submits to the auctioneer a tuple
([IDsm]pkB , [Qm]pkB ).
2: Buyers: Each buyer n submits to the auctioneer a tuple
((xn, yn), [ID
b
n]pkB , [Bn]pkB ).
Phase II: Secure group formation
3: Auctioneer: Constructs a conflict graph of buyers, and
transforms each seller or buyer tuple as follows.
([IDsm]pkB , [Qm]pkB )→ ([[IDsm]], [[Qm]])
([IDbn]pkB , [Bn]pkB )→ ([[IDbn]], [[Bn]])
Sends the conflict graph, all buyer tuples and the agent’s
corresponding parts of all seller tuples to the agent.
4: Agent: Performs bid-independently buyer group forma-
tion and gets a group set G = {G1, G2, . . . , GT }. Then
SS-blinds the buyer tuples of each group Gt, pads Gt to
R = maxtRt buyer tuples, and finally returns the SS-
blinded and padded group set G∗ to the auctioneer.
Phase III: Garbled circuit computing
5: Agent: Decrypts its corresponding parts of both group set
G∗ and all seller tuples to get its share of sensitive inputs,
and garbles the auction circuit and its share of sensitive
inputs, and sends the garbled circuit, the garbled values
obtained and output decoding to the auctioneer.
6: Auctioneer: Decrypts its corresponding parts of both
group set G∗ and all seller tuples to get its share of sen-
sitive inputs, and executes the garbled circuit to compute
the auction outcome in the clear, with the agent’s garbled
share and its plain share of sensitive inputs, and the output
decoding.
Buyer n: ((xn, yn), [IDbn]pkB , [Bn]pkB ), for n = 1, 2, ..., N
Since we have assumed that all communication channels are
authenticated secure, all sensitive inputs would keep private
and would not be eavesdropped. Although the auctioneer
obtains all the inputs needed for the auction, it knows nothing
about the sensitive inputs.
Phase II: Secure group formation
In this phase, the auctioneer first constructs a conflict graph
of buyers according to their geographic locations. Secondly,
the auctioneer reforms the seller or buyer tuples as follows.
Seller m: ([IDsm]pkB , [Qm]pkB ), for m = 1, 2, ...,M
Buyer n: ([IDbn]pkB , [Bn]pkB ), for n = 1, 2, ..., N
These tuples are then converted into the joint encryption
forms between the auctioneer and the agent as described in
Section III-C:
Seller m: ([[IDsm]], [[Qm]]), for m = 1, 2, ...,M
Buyer n: ([[IDbn]], [[Bn]]), for n = 1, 2, ..., N
Finally, the auctioneer sends the conflict graph, all buyer
tuples {([[IDbn]], [[Bn]])}Nn=1, and the agent’s corresponding
parts of all seller tuples {([[IDsm]]B , [[Qm]]B)}Mm=1 to the agent.
8Note that here the conflict graph is “blinded”, i.e., it merely
indicates whether one buyer conflicts with another buyer, but
all buyers are anonymous.
Upon receiving the conflict graph from the auctioneer, the
agent executes a grouping algorithm to divide the buyers into
several groups, where the members of the same group will
not conflict with each other when using an identical channel.
Notice that this grouping operation is bid-independent, and
we denote the set of non-conflict buyer groups by G =
{G1, G2, . . . , GT }, with Rt buyer tuples in each group Gt.
Next, the agent blinds the buyer tuples of each group Gt
using the SS-blinding of the joint encryption, and pads each
group Gt with null buyers ([[0]], [[0]]) to R = maxtRt buyer
tuples. This blinding prevents the auctioneer from identifying
buyers by matching the values of its parts in the jointly
encrypted buyer tuples, while the padding hides the difference
of buyer groups in member size. Afterward, the agent returns
these SS-blinded and padded group set G∗ to the auctioneer.
Phase III: Garbled circuit computing
In this phase, both the auctioneer and the agent hold their
corresponding parts of jointly encrypted group set G∗ and
seller tuples. Each of them decrypts its respective parts to
get its share of all sensitive inputs necessary for the auction.
Then, the agent generates a garbled circuit with shared inputs
based on the given auction Boolean circuit, garbles its share
of sensitive inputs, and sends the garbled circuit, the garbled
values, and the decoding table for the outcome to the auction-
eer. Finally, the auctioneer evaluates the garbled circuit and
decodes the output.
For this phase, the most important thing is to design a data-
oblivious algorithm based on TDSA auction mechanism. The
data-oblivious algorithm can then be easily converted into a
Boolean circuit, which is used in this phase. We describe this
data-oblivious algorithm shown in Algorithm 2 as follows.
Step 1: Initialization
In this step, two arrays S and G are constructed to represent
all sellers and all buyer groups, and an array Gt is constructed
to represent all buyers of each group t. In these arrays, each
seller, each group, and each buyer are represented by a seller
tuple, a group tuple, and a buyer tuple, respectively:
Seller tuples: (IDi, Qi, wsi ), i ∈ [1..M ]
Group tuples: (Bgt , w
g
t , Ct, P
g
t ), t ∈ [1..T ]
Buyer tuples: (IDt,j , Bt,j , Bvt,j , w
b
t,j), j ∈ [1..R], t ∈ [1..T ]
where R = maxtRt, and wsi , w
g
t , and w
b
j are binary flags
indicating whether seller i, group t, and buyer j is a winner
(1) or not (0), respectively.
The resulted arrays S, G, and Gt are initialized as follows,
where the “null” symbol ⊥ is a placeholder.
S =
 i : 1 · · · MIDi : ID1 · · · IDM
Qi : Q1 · · · QM
wsi : 0 · · · 0
 ,G =

t : 1 · · · T
Bgt : ⊥ · · · ⊥
wgt : 0 · · · 0
Ct : 0 · · · 0
P gt : ⊥ · · · ⊥

Gt =

j : 1 · · · R
IDt,j : IDt,1 · · · IDt,R
Bt,j : Bt,1 · · · Bt,R
Bvt,j : ⊥ · · · ⊥
wbt,j : 0 · · · 0

Step 2: Secure virtual group bidding
Algorithm 2 Data-oblivious SDSA Auction
Input: The set of sellers S, the set of buyer groups G∗
Output: Winners and their clearing prices
(1) Initialization:
1: Initialize matrix S, G, Gt
(2) Secure virtual group bidding:
2: for t = 1 . . . T do
3: Sort Gt in non-ascending order of Bt,j
4: //Abuse same indexes after sorting
5: for j = 1 . . . R do
6: Bvt,j ← Bt,j × j
7: Bgt ← max(Bgt , Bvt,j)
8: end for
9: end for
(3) Secure preliminary winner determination:
10: Sort S in non-descending order of Qi
11: Sort {Bgt }Tt=1 in non-ascending order
12: m← min(T,M)
13: for φ =m . . . 2 do
14: λφ ← (Bgφ ≥ Qφ ∧Bgφ 6= Bgφ−1)
15: end for
16: δm ← λm
17: P s ← Qm · δm
18: P g ← Bg
m
· δm
19: for φ =m− 1 . . . 1 do
20: λφ ← λφ ∨ λφ+1
21: δφ ← λφ ⊕ λφ+1
22: P s ← P s +Qφ · δφ
23: P g ← P g +Bgφ · δφ
24: wsφ ← λφ+1
25: end for
(4) Secure washing out:
26: for t = 1 . . . T do
27: wgt ← (Bgt > P g)
28: wbt,R ← wgt ∧ (Bvt,R > P g)
29: for j = R− 1 . . . 1 do
30: wbt,j ← wgt ∧ ((Bvt,j > P g) ∨ wbt,j+1)
31: Ct ← max(Ct, j · (wgt ∧ wbt,j))
32: end for
33: P gt ← wgt · (P g/Ct)
34: end for
(5) Pricing:
35: Collect clearing prices for sellers: S = {(IDsi , P si )}Mi=1
36: Collect clearing prices for buyers: B = {(IDbj , P bj )}Nj=1
37: Sort S in term of IDsi , and Sort B in term of IDbj
38: return S and B
This step computes virtual group bids Bvt,j and group bids
Bgt with two for-loops. The outer for-loop iterates over the
groups, while the nested for-loop computes the group bid Bgt
for each group Gt:
1) The outer for-loop sorts buyers of Gt in non-ascending
order of Bt,j , and the buyers will be deleted in this order at
“Secure washing out” step.
2) Then, the nested for-loop enumerates all virtual group
bids Bvt,j of Gt, and selects the highest virtual group bid as
the group bid of group Gt.
Step 3: Secure preliminary winner determination
This step employs McAfee’s design to preliminarily deter-
mine winning sellers and winning groups. Since this procedure
9contains many operations such as comparisons and selections
depending on requests or bids, it is challenging to convert
it into a data-oblivious algorithm. To address the challenge,
a general solution is to introduce appropriate binary flags
indicating various conditions, and then use them to data-
obliviously determine critical sellers and groups, and finally
compute the corresponding clearing prices. This is done via
the following steps.
First, sellers are sorted in non-descending order of requests,
and group bids are sorted in non-ascending order. Notice that
here group bids rather than group tuples are sorted, so that
only values other than tuples are swapped during the sorting,
and this reduces computation overhead. Whether a group is a
winning group can be determined simply in “Secure washing
out” step by comparing it’s group bid with the clearing price
P g for groups.
Second, in order to find out the critical index Φ data-
obliviously, two arrays of binary flags, λφ and δφ with
φ ∈ {1, ...,m}, wherem = min (T,M), are needed and work
as follows:
λφ: indicates whether φ is less than or equal to the critical
index Φ in McAfee rules (λφ = 1) or not (λφ = 0) (Line 14
& 20).
δφ: indicates whether φ is equal to the critical index Φ in
McAfee rules (δφ = 1) or not (δφ = 0) (Line 16 & 21).
According to the auction logic, the two flag arrays should
take values with the following pattern: φ : 1 · · · Φ− 1 Φ Φ + 1 · · · mλφ : 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · · 0
δφ : 0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0

Then, it is straightforward to compute the price for Φ − 1
winning sellers and Φ − 1 winning groups (Line 17 & 22,
Line 18 & 23):
P s = P s +Qφ · δφ, P g = P g +Bgφ · δφ.
In the end, binary flag wsφ of seller φ can be updated as
follows: when k ≥ m, seller φ is bound to be a loser, and it
remains that wsφ = 0 as initialization; when 1 ≤ φ ≤ m − 1,
wsφ can be determined by w
s
φ = λφ+1 (Line 24).
Step 4: Secure washing out
This step eliminates buyers among winning buyer groups,
whose bids are too low to afford the clearing price P g . To
achieve data-obliviousness, we have to do the same washing
out for every group, and use wbt,j to mark whether buyer j of
group Gt is a final winning buyer. This is done as below.
Firstly, the outer for-loop iterates over all buyer groups, and
sets values to binary flags wgt by comparing group bids with
the clearing price P g for groups (Line 27).
Secondly, an inner for-loop selects the largest virtual group
of Gt, whose virtual bid is larger than P g , and deletes other
buyers outside this largest virtual group (Line 28 & 30).
Meanwhile, the number of winning buyers in group t (i.e.
Ct) is computed (Line 31).
Finally, the price for each winning group t is shared by its
winning members: P gt = P
g/Ct (Line 33).
Step 5: Pricing
This step computes the prices for all sellers and all buyers. It
first constructs an array S of M seller tuples and an array B of
N buyer tuples. For each seller i, it creates a tuple (IDsi , P
s
i );
For each buyer j, it creates a tuple (IDbj , P
b
j ). Then, it extracts
the IDs and clearing prices for buyers and sellers from the
processed arrays S, G, and Gt with t ∈ [1..T ]. Specifically,
the clearing price for seller i can be obtained by computing
P si = w
s
i · P s, the clearing price for buyer j within group t
can be obtained by computing P bj = w
g
t ·wbj · P gt . In order to
prevent an adversary from inferring the request ranking or bid
ranking information based on the order of sellers or buyers in
the auction outcome, the algorithm should reorder the winning
sellers or the winning buyers in term of ID or any other
attribute independent of requests or bids before outputting the
auction outcome.
C. Security Analysis
We now prove the security of Protocol 1 with the security
requirements and security definition described in Section II-C.
As stated in the same section, it is easy to verify that each
seller, or each buyer, or anyone not participating in the auction
learns nothing about the sensitive inputs except what can be
revealed from the auction outcome. Thus, we mainly prove that
through running the proposed protocol neither the auctioneer
nor the agent can learn anything about the sensitive inputs
beyond what is revealed by the auction outcome, and this can
be stated as Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. As long as the auctioneer and the agent are not
corrupted simultaneously, Protocol 1 is secure against semi-
honest adversaries.
Proof: To prove the security of Protocol 1, we first prove
the security of each phase in two separate cases, depending
on which party is corrupted. For each phase, we show that for
all PPT adversaries, the corrupted party’s view based on the
auctioneer and the agent’s interaction is indistinguishable to
its view when it interacts with a simulator instead. In other
words, we show that there exist simulators S1 and S2 that
satisfy conditions (1) and (2) for each phase. Then, due to the
sequential composition theorem [25], we actually prove the
security of the entire protocol.
Phase I Submission: In this phase, each seller (resp. buyer)
encrypts its ID and request (resp. bid) with the agent’s public
key pkB , and submits these encrypted sensitive inputs to
the auctioneer. Since the encryption (i.e., Paillier encryption)
is semantically secure, the auctioneer cannot decrypt the
ciphertexts. Also, each buyer sends its geographic location
to the auctioneer, but location information is supposed to be
input of the auctioneer, and is independent on the sensitive
inputs. Thus, the auctioneer learns nothing about the sensitive
inputs. Meanwhile, the agent sees nothing in this phase, and it
certainly learns nothing about the sensitive inputs. Therefore,
this phase is secure.
Phase II Secure group formation: In this phase, the
auctioneer’s view includes:
• The view (e.g., the conflict graph of buyers, the joint
ciphertexts) that can be inferred from the ciphertexts and
buyers’ locations just as it sees in Phase I;
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• T buyer groups with R members each, with no IDs or
bids known.
The agent’s view includes a share of all sellers’ IDs and
requests, and that each buyer conflicts with some other buyers,
and does not conflict with the remaining other buyers, with no
IDs and bids known.
It is straightforward to verify that both views are indepen-
dent on the sensitive inputs (i.e., IDs, requests, and bids), and
neither the auctioneer or the agent can learn anything about
the sensitive inputs. Thus, this phase is secure.
Phase III Garbled circuit computing: In this phase, based
on a data-oblivious auction algorithm, which can be easily
converted into a Boolean circuit, the agent constructs a garbled
circuit and garbles its shares of the sensitive inputs. The agent
then sends the garbled circuit, garbled values and decoding
information to the auctioneer. Upon receiving all the informa-
tion sent from the agent, the auctioneer uses them together
with its shares of the sensitive inputs to compute the auction
outcome in the clear. This phase is a classical application of the
garbled circuit protocol (a.k.a. Yao’s protocol), and its security
has been proved in [23].
Since the above three phases are composed sequentially, it
follows from the sequential composition theory that Protocol 1
is secure against semi-honest adversaries. 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of SDSA
in term of computation and communication overheads, and
compare it with the original auction mechanism TDSA.
A. Experimental Method
Our simulation experiments are conducted using Java on
a 64-bit Windows 7 desktop with Intel(R) core(TM) i5 CPU
@ 3.30GHz and 8GB of memory. All experimental results
are averaged over 10 runs. Especially, we implement SDSA
with Paillier cryptosystem with 1024-bit plaintext space and
FastGC, a garbled circuit computation framework. The auc-
tioneer and the agent are simulated by two processes on the
machine.
To evaluate SDSA extensively, different experimental pa-
rameters including the number of buyers, the number of
sellers, and the bit length of requests or bids, are configured.
Usually, for an experiment, one of the above parameters varies,
while the other two are fixed. For the sake of brevity, we only
present the default configuration here. Buyers are randomly
distributed in a 2000m × 2000m area, and the interference
range is 500m. The requests of sellers are uniformly distributed
in [1, 151), while the bids of buyers are uniformly distributed
in [1, 51). Requests, bids, and IDs are represented in 16 bits
by default. For the joint encryption, we by default let K = 32
(Note that we combine an ID and a bid or request as a value),
and K ′ = 81.
B. Experimental Results
We conduct experiments to compare the performance of
SDSA and TDSA as: (1) the number of buyers varies; (2)
the number of sellers varies. We also conduct an experiment to
evaluate the performance of SDSA as the bit length of requests
or bids varies.
(1) Number of buyers varies
Fig. 4 plots the performance comparison between SDSA
and TDSA, as the number of buyers N increases from 1000
to 8000, and the number of sellers is fixed at M = 600,
M = 500, and M = 400. Specifically, Fig. 4(a) shows that
the running times of SDSA and TDSA follow the same growth
pattern, which is approximately a quadratic polynomial of
N . Furthermore, the gaps of running times between the two
auctions are mild, e.g., when M = 600, and N = 7000, the
corresponding running times are 680s and 125s, respectively.
Fig. 4(b) shows that the communication cost of SDSA is
nearly linear with N (Note that TDSA is run merely by the
auctioneer, and needs no communications). Also, both Figs.
4(a) and 4(b) illustrate that all curves with different M values
nearly overlap.
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Fig. 4. Computation and communication comparisons for our protocols as
the number of buyers N varies
From the above observations, we can conclude that: (i) when
N is large, the computation overheads of both SDSA and
TDSA tend to be dominated by the group formation algorithm,
which consumes approximately quadratic polynomial time in
N ; (ii) SDSA incur limited computation and communication
overheads compared to TDSA, and the relative overheads
decrease as N increases; (iii) the number of sellers M has
little effect on the computation and communication overheads,
when M is much smaller than N .
(2) Number of seller varies
Fig. 5 depicts the performance comparison between SDSA
and TDSA, as the number of sellers M increases from 100 to
800, and the number of buyers N = 6000, N = 5000, and
N = 4000, respectively. The curves in both Figs. 5(a) and 5(b)
are nearly flat, which validates point (iii) concluded above.
Nonetheless, it looks like that M has a stronger influence
on the communication overhead than on the computation
overhead. This is because the increase of sellers only adds
some relatively few time-consuming calculations, and yet it
does add some cipher data on the communication between the
auctioneer and the agent.
(3) Bit length varies
In Fig. 6, we vary the bit length of requests or bids from
12 to 34, while fix the number of buyers N = 4000, and
the number of sellers M = 400. Both computation and
communication overheads increase almost linearly with the bit
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Fig. 5. Computation and communication comparisons for our protocols as
the number of sellers M varies
length. The underlying reason is that each bit for every request
or every bid need to be represented as a random key in garbled
circuits, and the increase of bit length will undoubtedly raise
the cost of both computation and communication.
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Fig. 6. Computation and communication comparisons for our protocols as
the bit length of bids varies
From the above, we can conclude that SDSA is efficient
in both computation and communication performance, even
in large-scale double spectrum auctions, e.g., when there are
8000 buyers and 600 sellers, SDSA takes about 14 minutes
time, and communicates about 600 MB data on a normal PC,
and thus it is practical for real applications.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed SDSA, a privacy-preserving
mechanism for double spectrum auctions. Basing on TDSA,
SDSA provides a socially efficient spectrum auction. However,
this in turn poses challenges for privacy achievement. We have
tackled the challenges by leveraging on three security tech-
niques: homomorphic encryption, secret sharing and garbled
circuits. Specifically, we have designed a novel joint encryp-
tion based on homomorphic encryption to address the secure
group formation, and have designed a data-oblivious auction
algorithm and applied garbled circuits to address the secure
auction procedure. Furthermore, we have implemented SDSA,
and performed extensive experiments to illustrate that SDSA
is efficient in performance and practical for real applications.
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